Yasuko Koido
Japan’s Takaichi government approved a plan to cut the food consumption tax to 1% from 8% without resorting to debt finance in FY2027-2028 (Q2 2027-Q1 2029). However, we now assume that a primary balance will deteriorate to a 3% of GDP deficit and the 10-year Japanese government bond yield will rise to 3% by the end of 2026, as it will be challenging to fully make up for the lost tax revenue.
US-Japan coordinated FX intervention will likely have a longer lasting effect compared with past unilateral interventions but it still will not be enough to reverse the trend of yen weakness. We assume a slightly stronger path for the yen in the coming months but maintain our yen forecast for year-end and in 2027.
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) kept its policy rate at 1% at Friday’s meeting, as expected. We continue to project that the central bank will hike in December after assessing the impact of the June rate hike, as requested by the government. But a rate hike in October is possible, especially if the yen depreciates further.
There is a growing consensus that artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to raise productivity, improve competitiveness, and underpin long-term economic growth. Yet at the same time, governments are placing more weight on AI sovereignty, seeking greater control and oversight over the data, compute infrastructure, AI models, tooling, and applications that increasingly underpin economic and public-sector activity.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration will set economic and fiscal policy guidelines for 2026 in mid-July, targeting JPY370trn (US$2.3trn) in combined public and private investment by fiscal year 2040. We believe the guidelines heighten the risk of serious fiscal slippage in the coming years.
One of the great privileges of working in economic consulting is the opportunity to see the same issue from many different perspectives.
Over the past year, I’ve had conversations with technology companies on topics ranging from AI governance and copyright to data regulation, digital competition, and semiconductor policy. They are very different debates, involving different technologies, different stakeholders, and different policy objectives. Yet they often arrive at remarkably similar economic questions.
The Bank of Japan (BoJ) raised its policy rate from 0.75% to 1% on June 16 despite the uncertainty around the Middle East conflict. The BoJ kept its forward guidance that it will continue interest rate normalization. However, the persistent perception in FX markets that the BoJ is behind the curve will likely continue to put pressure on the central bank to hike the policy rate faster and higher in the coming quarters.
We’ve raised our end-2026 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB) yield forecast to 2.8% from 2.5%. The prospect of higher inflation will keep yields elevated globally, and concerns about Japan’s fiscal expansion will also persist. We now see the risks to our JGB forecast as more balanced, although a further increase still isn’t out of the question.
Despite the continued uncertainty around the Middle East conflict, we now expect the Bank of Japan (BoJ) to raise its policy rate from 0.75% to 1% on June 16. No action from the bank would invite further yen depreciation, exacerbating the terms-of-trade shock. In our view, BoJ Governor Kazuo Ueda’s hawkish speech on June 3 is a precommitment to a hike.
A sweeping reset of global trade policies under Trump 2.0 have triggered a sharp global pullback in foreign direct investments, yet Asia has shown notable resilience. In a study for the Hinrich Foundation, Oxford Economics examines how structural shifts in Factory Asia and China’s rise as a regional investor have been reshaping regional capital flows. The report explores what these changes mean for the trajectory of Asia’s FDI in a rapidly changing global environment.
We’ve raised our terminal rate assumption for the Bank of Japan to 1.5% from 1% in February. This reflects changes in our estimate for Japan’s neutral interest rate, r* – the equilibrium level at which the policy rate should eventually settle – resulting from recent revisions to GDP, a new fiscal policy outlook, and rising inflation expectations.
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) landslide election victory on Sunday doesn’t change our expectation of a primary fiscal deficit of 2%-3% of GDP in FY2026-FY2028 – we still see the deficit only starting to decline from FY2029. We also keep our view that the 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB) yield will be at 2.3% at end-2026 and 2.5% at end-2027 and beyond.